

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15 IO-10

ACDA-10 /088 W

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R 181620Z JUL 75

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1385

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 18623

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, TU

SUBJECT: "LE FIGARO" INTERVIEW WITH TURKISH PRIME
MINISTER ECEVIT

1. JULY 17 "LE FIGARO" CONTAINS INTERVIEW WITH TURKISH
PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT GIVING HIS COMMENTS ON ANNIVERSARY
OF TURKISH LANDING IN CYPRUS. FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY
INFORMAL TRANSLATION.

BEGIN TEXT: IT IS NOT WE WHO PRODUCED A FAIT ACCOMPLI
IN CYPRUS, BUT RATHER THE GREEK MILITARY. WE DID WHAT
A GUARANTEEING STATE MUST DO IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES.
THE POLICY OF THE GREEK JUNTA WOULD HAVE LED TO THE END
OF AN INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC AND TO THE ANNEXATION OF
CYPRUS BY GREECE. IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT I WAS A MAN
OF WAR, BUT I ACTED AS A MAN OF PEACE FOR CYPRUS.
TWO SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS ARE:

-- AFTER THE GREEK OPERATION WE DID EVERYTHING WE
COULD TO AVOID A DIRECT MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE
ISLAND. TO THIS END I WENT TO LONDON, THE SECOND
GUARANTEEING STATE, AND PROPOSED TO WORK TOGETHER TO
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MAINTAIN THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ISLAND AND ASSURE THE

SECURITY OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS. IT WAS ONLY AFTER THE DEFINITE REFUSAL OF THE BRITISH THAT WE WERE OBLIGED TO INTERVENE MILITARILY.

-- DURING OUR FIRST MILITARY INTERVENTION WE CONTENTED OURSELVES WITH A BEACHHEAD ON THE ISLAND, HOPING THAT THE GREEKS WOULD UNDERSTAND THE PURPOSE OF THIS MOVEMENT AND WOULD BE MORE REALISTIC REGARDING CONVERSATIONS.

AT THE END OF THE FIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE, ON JULY 31, WE HAD THE FEELING THAT THE GREEKS HAD UNDERSTOOD, BUT THEY ACTED IN A COMPLETELY CONTRARY MANNER. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY SHOULD HAVE EVACUATED THE TURKISH ENCLAVES, BUT THEY DIDN'T. ALSO THEY HAD AGREED TO FREE THE TURKISH HOSTAGES-WOMEN, OLD PEOPLE AND CHILDREN - BUT THEY DID NOT KEEP THEIR PROMISE. THE REASON THEY REFUSED, I BELIEVE, COMES FROM THE FACT THAT THE GREEKS, AFTER THE DISCOURAGEMENT CAUSED BY THE JUNTA, HAD AGAIN FOUND HOPE THANKS TO THEIR NEW REGIME. WE HAD HOPED THAT THIS CHANGE OF REGIME WOULD MAKE THE GREEKS MORE REALISTIC, BUT IT DID NOT. THE GREEKS' HAVING REGAINED THEIR PRESTIGE THOUGHT THEY COULD PROFIT FROM THIS HOPE TO MOBILIZE WESTERN OPINION AGAINST TURKEY AND TO GET CLOSE TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO PUT PRESSURE ON TURKEY.

DURING THE FIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE ONE THING MADE US DOUBT THE GREEKS' SINCERITY: WE HAD PROPOSED A SECURITY ZONE OF A FEW KILOMETERS AROUND THE TURKISH FORCES UNDER UN CONTROL IN ORDER TO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF OUR ARMY. THE GREEKS, SUPPORTED BY THE BRITISH, DID NOT ACCEPT. IT IS DIFFICULT TO RESPECT A CEASE-FIRE WHEN TWO ARMIES ARE FACE TO FACE. I SENT A MESSAGE TO CARAMANLIS AS SOON AS HE RETURNED TO ATHENS FROM PARIS ASKING HIM NOT TO ASK FOR THE HELP OF OTHER COUNTRIES. I HAD PROPOSED A MEETING, WITHOUT CONDITIONS. HE WAS POLITE BUT HE REFUSED.

IF WE COULD HAVE HAD THAT MEETING, A SOLUTION COULD HAVE BEEN FOUND WITHOUT OUR HAVING TO INTERVENE

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MILITARILY A SECOND TIME. IN MY OPINION IT WAS THE BEST MOMENT FOR GREECE BECAUSE ALL RESPONSIBILITY WOULD HAVE FALLEN ON THE PREVIOUS REGIME AND NO GREEKS WOULD HAVE CONSIDERED ATTACKING CARAMANLIS. WITH THE LOSS OF TIME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF FUTURE EVENTS NECESSARILY FELL ON CARAMANLIS.

THE SECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE WENT VERY BADLY.

THE GREEKS WERE SO SURE OF THE SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL
OPINION THAT THEY WERE INFLEXIBLE. UNFORTUNATELY THE
BRITISH ENCOURAGED THEM IN THIS SENSE. WE PUT OUR
PROPOSITIONS ON THE TABLE, INCLUDING A SOLUTION OF
THE MULTI-CANTONAL TYPE WHICH WAS AGAINST OUR OWN

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INTERESTS AND NOT VERY LOGICAL BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE
LED TO FRICTION ON THE ISLAND. WE DID NOT, AS IT HAS
BEEN CLAIMED, DEMAND A REPLY TO OUR PROPOSALS IN 24
HOURS.

WE DEMANDED ONLY ONE PREREQUISITE. OUR FORCES
WERE IN A VERY SMALL SECTOR, EXPOSED TO THE GREEK-
CYPRIOTS TROOPS, AND BETWEEN FAMAGUSTA AND NICOSIA
IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD WERE STATIONED.
WE SIMPLY WANTED THE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE ZONE
BETWEEN FAMAGUSTA AND NICOSIA, OUTSIDE OF KARPAS.
WE WERE READY TO ACCEPT ANY CONTROLS. THEREBY THE
GUARANTEE FOR THE TURKISH AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS FORCES

WOULD HAVE BEEN ASSURED. THE GREEKS REFUSED OUR PROPOSAL.
IT WAS IN DESPERATION THAT WE DECIDED ON OUR SECOND
INTERVENTION.

QUESTION: OBSERVERS TODAY ESTIMATE THAT THE
COUP D'ETAT AGAINST CARAMANLIS WAS ORGANIZED ON THE
BASIS OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN AMERICANS AND TURKS. IF
IT HAD SUCCEEDED CYPRUS WOULD HAVE BECOME A "SUPER-BASE
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FOR THE U.S." AND THE TURKS WERE TO HAVE RECEIVED
PROMISES OF NUMEROUS ADVANTAGES ON THE ISLAND.

ECEVIT'S REPLY: THAT IS A GREEK DREAM. AMERICA
DID EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO KEEP US FROM LANDING. MR.
SISCO LEFT MY OFFICE ON JULY 20 AFTER LEARNING THAT
TURKISH MILITARY PLANES WERE ABOUT TO TAKE OFF FOR
CYPRUS AND THAT IF HE DELAYED ANY LONGER HE WOULD NOT
BE ABLE TO LEAVE ON HIS OWN PLANE.

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